We analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a repeated game against a collection of short-lived (myopic) Bayesian players. The running assumption in our model is that the information at the short-lived players is nested in that of the long-lived player in a causal fashion. Under this setup, we show that the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria coincide with a properly defined Markov perfect equilibria. Hence, a dynamic programming formulation is obtained for the computation of optimal strategies for the strategic long-lived player in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We also establish the existence of an optimal stationary strategy and, under further assumptions, the continuity of the equilibrium payoffs. The undiscounted average payoff setup is considered separately, this case is also used as a tool leading to an upper payoff bound for an arbitrarily patient long-lived player in the discounted average payoff setup. This achievable upper bound is identified with a stage game Stackelberg equilibrium payoff. Furthermore, by using measure concentration techniques, we obtain a lower payoff bound on the value of reputation. Our findings contribute to the reputations literature by obtaining structural and computational results on the equilibrium behavior in finite-horizon, infinite-horizon and undiscounted settings, as well as continuity results in the prior probabilities, and refined upper and lower bounds on the value of reputations. In particular, we exhibit that a control theoretic formulation can be utilized to characterize the equilibrium behavior.
Introduction
It is well known that "reputation" plays an important role in long run relationships. When one considers buying a product from a firm, his action will depend on his belief about this firm, i.e., the firm's reputation, which he has formed based on previous experiences. Many interactions among economic agents are repeated and are in the form of long-run relationships. Therefore, economists have been extensively studying the role of reputation in long-run relationships and repeated games.
By using reputations as a conceptual as well as a mathematical quantitative variable, economists have been able to explain how reputation can rationalize the intuitive equilibria, as in the expectation of cooperation in early rounds of a finitely repeated prisoners' dilemma [36] , and entry deterrence in the early rounds of the chain store game [37] , [42] . Reputational concerns can also explain the benefit of providing high quality products [35] , and the benefit of generating good returns to investors [16] . Reputation can help time-inconsistent governments to commit to noninflationary monetary policies [5] , [14] , low capital taxation [10] , [9] , and repayment of sovereign debt [11] .
Recently, there has been an emergence of use of tools from information and control theory in the reputations literature [28] , [18] , [20] . Such tools have been proved to be useful in providing bounds on the value of reputation.
In this paper, by adopting and generalizing recent results from stochastic control theory and source coding theory, we provide a new approach and establish refined results on repeated games with incomplete information. Before stating our contributions and the problem setup more explicitly, we provide a brief overview of the related literature in the following.
Related Literature
Kreps, Milgrom, Roberts, and Wilson (see [36] , [37] and [42] ) introduced the adverse selection approach to study reputations in (finitely) repeated games. Fudenberg and Levine [23] extended this approach to infinitely repeated games and showed that a patient long-lived player facing infinitely many short-lived players can guarantee herself a payoff close to her Stackelberg payoff when there is a slight probability that the long-lived player is a commitment type who always plays the Stackelberg action. When compared to the folk theorem ( [27] , [26] ), their results imply an intuitive expectation: the equilibria with relatively high payoffs are more likely to arise due to reputation effects.
Fudenberg, Kreps, and Maskin [22] provided, in a complete information environment, an upper bound for the equilibrium payoffs of a long-lived player facing infinitely many short-lived players under imperfect public monitoring. This bound is independent of the discount factor of the long-lived player and might be strictly less than the Stackelberg payoff. Hence, Fudenberg and Levine [24] 's results imply that under imperfect public monitoring new equilibrium payoffs may arise with incomplete information when the discount factor of the long-lived player is sufficiently high.
Even though the results of Fudenberg and Levine [23] , [24] hold for both perfect and imperfect public monitoring, Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson [13] showed that reputation effects are not sustainable in the long-run when there is imperfect public monitoring. In other words, it is impossible to maintain a permanent reputation for playing a strategy that does not play an equilibrium of the complete information game under imperfect public monitoring. While all of the above results hold true when a strategic long lived player tries to build up a "good" reputation, Ely and Valimaki [19] showed that the incentives for avoiding "bad reputation" might lead to market breakdown.
Since Cripps, Mailath, and Samuelson's work [13] , there has been a large literature which studies the possibility / impossibility of maintaining permanent reputations: Ekmekci [17] showed that reputation can be sustained permanently in the steady state by using rating systems. Ekmekci, Gossner, and Wilson [18] showed that impermanent types could lead to permanent reputations, as well. Atakan and Ekmekci [2] , [3] , [4] provided positive and negative results on permanent reputations with long-lived players on both sides. Liu [39] provided dynamics that explain accumulation, consumption, and restoration of reputation when the discovery of the past is costly. Liu and Skrzypacz [40] provided similar dynamics for reputations when there is limited record-keeping. Faingold and Sannikov [21] studied continuous time reputation games and provided a characterization of the equilibrium payoff set by making use of stochastic differential equations. Hörner and Lovo [31] analyzed reputations by making use of the concept of belief free equilibria in repeated games with incomplete information.
Sorin [47] unified and improved some of the results in reputations literature by using tools from Bayesian learning and merging due to Kalai and Lehrer [33] , [34] . Gossner [28] was the first to point out that making use of the concept of relative entropy has advantages in terms of tractability to study bounds on reputation: He provided quite powerful bounds on reputations employing basic properties (such as the chain rule) of relative entropy. These bounds coincide in the limit with the bounds provided by Fudenberg and Levine [23] , [24] . Faingold [20] made use of these techniques to provide reputation bounds for repeated moral hazard games in which a long-lived player interacts frequently with a population of short-lived players where the monitoring technology varies with the length of the period of interaction. In economics, entropy and information theoretic techniques were not only used in the reputations literature; Sims [45] , [46] used the concept of mutual information which uses the reduction in the entropy of a random variable as the measure of information flow. This started a new avenue in Macroeconomics on rational inattention.
Contributions and the Connections with Literature
Contributions of the paper. In this paper, we analyze reputation games where a strategic long-lived player acts in a repeated game against a collection of short-lived (myopic) Bayesian players. The running assumption in our model is that the information at the short-lived players is nested in that of the long-lived player in a causal fashion. This assumption is stronger than many of the existing work in the literature, however we are able to obtain stronger results than what currently exists in the literature in a number of directions. In particular, under this setup, we show that the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria coincide with a properly defined set of Markov perfect equilibria. Hence, a dynamic programming formulation is obtained for the computation of optimal strategies for the strategic long-lived player in any perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Such a formulation allows for establishing the existence of an optimal stationary strategy and, under further assumptions, the continuity of the equilibrium payoffs. The undiscounted average payoff is also considered. This setup is also useful as a method to obtain an upper payoff bound for an arbitrarily patient long-lived player in the discounted average payoff setup through an Abelian inequality. This achievable bound is identified with a stage game Stackelberg equilibrium payoff. Furthermore, by using measure concentration techniques, we obtain improved lower payoff bounds on the value of reputation. Extensions to more general setups are also presented.
Connections with related literature. There are a number of related results in the information theory and control literature on real-time signaling which provide powerful structural, topological, and operational results that are in principle similar to the reputations problem, despite the simplifications that come about due to the fact that in these fields, the players typically have a common utility function. Furthermore, such studies typically assume finitely repeated setups, whereas we consider here infinitely repeated setups which require non-trivial generalizations. We particularly mention [52] , [38] , [8] , [53] , [51] , [50] , [49] and [41] for various contexts but note that all of these studies except [38] have focused on finite horizon problems. Using tools of control theory and zero-delay source coding, we provide a new approach to study reputations: This approach not only results in a number of conclusions re-affirming certain results documented in the literature, but also provides new results and interpretations as we briefly discuss in the following.
Our first set of results are structural: We show that when the information available to the short-lived players is also available to the long-lived player, then any strategy of the longlived player against arbitrary strategies of player two's (even non-Bayesian strategies) can be replaced by a strategy which uses only long-lived player's own type and short-lived player's information without altering short-lived player's strategy. That is, any private strategy of the long-lived player is statistically irrelevant given the public information that are available to both of the players. We show that this is true for both finite horizon and infinite horizon games. One relevant result in the literature is due to Fudenberg and Levine [25] who show that sequential equilibrium outcomes and perfect public equilibrium outcomes coincide (see Appendix B of [25] ). However, our result holds for non-rational and hence non-equilibrium strategies for short-lived players as well. Hence, this result would also be useful for the study of reputation against non-Bayesian and/or boundedly rational (short-lived) players. Furthermore, when the long-lived player uses the structural result stated, and short-lived players respond optimally in a rational (Bayesian) fashion; we arrive at an equilibrium where in this equilibrium the long-lived player uses his own type and short-lived players' posteriors which serve as a sufficient statistic of the information of the short-lived players, and the short-lived players use only their conditional posteriors on the type of the long-lived player.
Building on these structural results, our second main result is to model the optimization problem the long-lived player faces as a controlled Markov chain. We show that the long-lived player's problem hence can be solved through an infinite horizon discounted payoff dynamic programming method. These results imply a stationary (time-invariant given the posteriors) equilibrium for both the long-lived player and the short-lived players. Furthermore, we establish the continuity of the payoff values in the prior of the short-lived players for every fixed discount factor, under a technical condition. This result is in agreement with the findings of [15] (who uses methods of Abreu, Pearce, and Stacchetti [1] to show similar continuity results) and implies that a conjecture by [13] is indeed true under this technical condition. On the other hand, for the undiscounted average payoff problem, the payoff function is not only continuous but it has an ergodic property that it is invariant to the initial prior, provided that the initial priors lead to the same invariant posterior; this will be made more precise later in the paper. We note that this controlled Markovian construction is also aligned with the observation that the set of perfect Bayesian equilibria of an infinitely repeated incomplete information game coincide with a family of Markov chains which was made by [6] . Furthermore, through an explicit measure-concentration analysis, in agreement with the findings of Fudenberg and Levine [24] , we observe that if the long-lived player has a commitment type which plays a static Stackelberg action, then no matter how small the prior measure on this type is, a payoff which is arbitrarily close to the static Stackelberg payoff can be achieved by a sufficiently patient long-lived player.
Related to this finding regarding Stackelberg payoffs, our third set of results are about the undiscounted average payoff and the arbitrarily patient long-lived player cases: By using Abelian inequalities we show that optimal stationary strategies exist under the undiscounted average payoff formulation. Furthermore, these inequalities deliver that an upper bound for the arbitrarily patient long-lived player in the discounted average payoff case is his static Stackelberg payoff as in Fudenberg and Levine [24] and Gossner [28] . Thus, we obtain parallel results to those by Fudenberg and Levine [24] and Gossner [28] through obtaining lower bounds and upper bounds. If measurements are informative, i.e., necessary identifiability conditions are met, and if a type is not a stage game equilibrium strategy then the normal type of the long-lived player will be asymptotically revealed to the short-lived players. This implies that if a type is not a stage game equilibrium strategy, the posterior probability of this type for the short-lived players will converge to 0. If necessary identifiability conditions are not met convergence to a non-informative equilibrium is also possible. These results are complementary to the findings of Cripps et.al. [13] .
Thus, this paper obtain equilibrium results both for the standard discounted average payoff problem as well as the undiscounted average payoff problem. Under a nestedness condition in the information structure of the setup, the paper provides new structural and computational results on the equilibrium behaviour, and develops new insights and refined upper and lower bounds under appropriate technical conditions. In particular, the paper establishes a control-theoretic footing for the reputations problem and allows for the applicability of the powerful computational and conceptual machinery of stochastic control theory for such problems. Our results are applicable not only for obtaining asymptotic bounds (as in when the discount factor converges to 1 or when the incomplete information probabilities decay to 0) but also obtains the structure of optimal strategies and explicit optimality equations for arbitrary discount factors of the long-lived player and arbitrary initial prior beliefs of the short-lived players. It is our hope that the machinery we provide in this paper will open a new avenue for applied work concerned with reputational effects in fields such as industrial organization, political economy, and macroeconomics. Other than those listed before a few related inspiring work in these fields are [5] , [16] , [30] , [32] , [43] , and [48] .
In the next chapter we start with Preliminaries. Chapter 3 provides our structural results on equilibrium behavior for when the long-lived player has a fixed discount factor. Chapter 4 provides results for when the long-lived player is arbitrarily patient as well as the undiscounted average payoff case. Chapter 5 provides a lower bound for the equilibrium payoff of the strategic long-lived player under reputation concerns in the standard setting. Chapter 6 discusses a number of extensions and Chapter 7 concludes the paper.
Preliminaries
A long-lived player (player 1) plays a repeated stage-game with a sequence of different shortlived players (player 2). Action sets of player 1 and player 2 in the stage-game are assumed to be finite and denoted by A 1 and A 2 , respectively. For convenience, we will refer to the long-lived player 1 by using the pronoun "she" and the short-lived player 2s by using the pronoun "he."
There is incomplete information regarding the type of the long-lived player 1. The set of types of player 1 is given by Ω = {ω n } ∪Ω where ω n is player 1's normal type andΩ is a finite set of commitment types. Each typeω ∈Ω is a simple type committed to playing the corresponding (possibly mixed) actionω ∈ ∆(A 1 ) at each stage of the interaction independent of the history of the play, where ∆(A 1 ) denotes the set of probability measures on A 1 . The initial distribution over player 1's types is µ ∈ ∆(Ω) which is assumed to have full support. This measure is common knowledge.
The stage game is a sequential game: 1 Player 1 moves first; when action a 1 is chosen by player 1 in the stage game; a public signal z 2 ∈ Z 2 is observed by Player 2 which is drawn according to the distribution q 2 (.|a 1 ) ∈ ∆(Z 2 ) where Z 2 is the finite set of player 2's all possible signals. Player 2, observing his signal, moves second; if action a 2 is chosen by player 2, a private signal z 1 ∈ Z 1 is observed by Player 1 which is drawn according to the distribution q 1 (.|a 2 ) ∈ ∆(Z 1 ) where Z 1 is the finite set of player 1's all possible signals. We assume the public signals observed by Player 2s are available to all subsequent players whereas Player 1's private signals are his private information. That is, the information at Player 2s is nested in that of Player 1, which we will refer as Assumption 1. Assumption 1. The information at player 2 at time t − 1 is a subset of the information at player 1 at time t.
We note that this assumption simply dictates that the measurements of the short-lived players are available to the long-lived player in a causal fashion; such an assumption is common in many practical scenarios involving reputations.
The stage game payoff function of the normal type long-lived player 1 is given by u 1 , and short-lived player 2's payoff function is given by u 2 , where u i : A 1 × A 2 → R. A generic history for player 2 at time t is given by h 2 t = (z 2 0 , z 2 1 , · · · , z 2 t ) ∈ H 2 t whereas a generic history for player 1 at time t is h 1
2 . Therefore, the set of histories prior to stage t for player 2 is H 2 t = H 2 t−1 × Z 2 with the usual convention that H 2 0 = ∅ whereas the set of histories prior to stage t for player 1 is H 1 t−1 with the usual convention that H 1 0 = ∅. A (behavioral) strategy for player 1 is a map:
that satisfies σ 1 (ω, h 1 t−1 ) =ω for everyω ∈Ω, since commitment types are required to play the corresponding strategy in the stage game. The set of all strategies for player 1 is denoted Σ 1 .
A strategy for player 2 at stage t is a map
We let Σ 2 t be the set of such strategies and let Σ 2 = Π t≥1 Σ 2 t denote the set of sequences of such strategies. A history h t of length t is an element of Ω × (A 1 × A 2 × Z 1 × Z 2 ) t describing player 1's type and all actions and signals to the players up to stage t. By standard arguments in the field (e.g. Kolmogorov's Extension Theorem [29] ), a strategy profile σ = (σ 1 , σ 2 ) ∈ Σ 1 × Σ 2 induces a unique probability distribution P σ over the set of plays
We let a t = (a 1 t , a 2 t ) represent the pair of actions chosen at stage t and let z t = (z 1 t , z 2 t ) denote the pair of signals received at stage t. Given ω ∈ Ω, P ω,σ (.) = P σ (.|ω) represents the distribution over plays conditional on player 1 being of type ω. Player 1's discount factor is 0 < δ < 1 and the expected discounted payoff to player 1 of a normal type is:
In most of our results we will assume that Player 2s are Bayesian rational. 3 Hence, we will restrict attention to Perfect Bayesian Nash equilibrium: In any such equilibrium, Player 1 maximizes his expected discounted payoff given that the short-lived players play a best response to their expectation according to their updated beliefs. Player 2s, playing the stage game only once, will just be responding to their expectation according to their beliefs which are updated according to the Bayes' Rule.
A strategy of player 2s, σ 2 , is a best response to σ 1 if, for all t,
where
denotes the information available at player 2 at time t.
Structural Results on Equilibrium Behavior
In the present formulation, player 1 is the strategic long-lived agent. Since player 2s' strategy is myopic, it follows that when the information at player 2 is nested in that of player 1, i.e., under Assumption 1, player 1 can formulate his strategy as a controlled Markovian system optimization, and thus through dynamic programming. The discounted nature of the optimization problem leads to the existence of a stationary solution. This is what we show below in section 3.2. But first, we provide two structural results on optimal strategies following steps parallel to Chapter 10 in [53] which builds on [51] [50], [49] and [52] . These structural results will be the key for the following Markov chain construction.
Structural Results
Consider first the finitely repeated game where the game is repeated T ∈ N times:
Our first structural result is Theorem 1 which shows that under Assumption 1 any strategy of normal type of player 1 -who is to maximize her discounted sum of payoffs-can be replaced with a strategy which only uses her type and the information of player 2 at time t. This is a crucial result which obtains the structure of optimal strategies for Player 1 under arbitrary strategies of Player 2.
This result is new, to our knowledge, in the economics literature. What is different here from the similar results in the repeated games literature is that this is true even when player 2s strategies are non-Bayesian. One relevant result is due to Fudenberg and Levine [25] who show that sequential equilibrium outcomes and perfect public equilibrium outcomes coincide (see Appendix B of [25] ).
Theorem 1 and Theorem 2 below have a coding theoretic flavor: The classic works by Witsenhausen [51] and Walrand and Varaiya [50] , are of particular relevance; Teneketzis [49] extended these approaches to the more general setting of non-feedback communication and [52] and [53] extended these results to more general state spaces (including R d ). Extension to infinite horizon stages have been studied in [38] . Theorem 1 is a generalization of Witsenhausen [51] . The proofs below build on the unified approach in [52] . However, these results are different from the above contributions due to the fact that the utility functions do not depend explicitly on the type of player 1, but depend explicitly on the actions a 1 t and that these actions are not available to player 2 unlike the setup in [52] . Furthermore, we will consider infinitely repeated scenarios in the discussion that follows.
We also note here as a remark that the signal z 2 t that will be available to short-lived player 2s after round t only depends on the action of the long-lived player 1 at round t:
In the finitely repeated game, under Assumption 1, without any loss, player 1 only uses his type and the information of player 2 at time t − 1 to generate a 1 t : Under any given sequence of strategies for myopic players (players 2), any strategy that player 1 adopts can be replaced with a strategy which only uses ω and {z 2 0 , z 2 1 , · · · , z 2 t−1 } (while the strategy of player 2 is unaltered).
Proof of Theorem 1. At time t = T , the payoff function can be written as follows, where γ 2 t denotes a given fixed strategy for player 2:
. Now, by a stochastic realization argument [7] , we can write z 2 t = R(a 1 t , v t ) for some independent noise process v t . As a result, the expected payoff conditioned on z 2 [0,t−1] is equal to, by the smoothing property of conditional expectation, the following:
for some G. Since v t is independent of all the other variables at times s ≤ t, it follows that there exists
Note that when ω is a commitment type, a 1 t is fixed quantity or a fixed random variable. Now, we will apply Witsenhausen's two stage lemma [51] , to show that we can obtain a lower bound for the double expectation by picking a 1 t as a result of a measurable function of ω, z 2 [0,t−1] . Thus, we will find a strategy which only uses (ω, z 2 [0,t−1] ) which performs as well as one which uses the entire memory available at Player 1. To make this precise, let us fix γ 2 t and define for every k ∈ M t :
Such a construction covers the domain set consisting of (x t , q [0,t−1] ) but possibly with overlaps. It covers the elements in Ω × T −1 t=0 Z 2 , since for every element in this product set, there is a minimizing k ∈ Z 2 . To avoid the overlap, define a function γ * ,1 t as:
with β 0 = ∅. The new strategy performs at least as well as the original strategy even though it has a restricted structure. The same discussion applies for earlier time stages as we discuss below. We iteratively proceed to study the other time stages. For a three-stage problem, the payoff at time t = 2 can be written as:
The expression inside the expectation is equal to for some measurable
, by a similar argument as above, a strategy at time 2 which uses ω and z 1 2 and which performs at least as good as the original strategy can be constructed. By similar arguments, a strategy at time t, 1 ≤ t ≤ T only uses (ω, z 2 [1,t−1] ) can be constructed. The strategy at time t = 0 uses ω.
As we mentioned earlier, Theorem 1 above holds for any sequence of strategies (even non-strategic) for Players 2. If we impose a Bayesian rationality condition for the player 2s, however, we obtain a more refined structural result, under the Bayesian rationality assumption. As mentioned before, in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium the short-lived player 2 at time t, playing the game only once, seeks to maximize
However, it may be that his best response, i.e. the maximizing action set arg max
is not unique. We add the following assumption, which essentially requires that the strategy of player 2 is measurable, yet rational. See Remark 2 for a relaxation of this assumption.
Assumption 2. Player 2's strategy is a measurable function of
This assumption is a natural one and is a consequence of the fact that player 2 plays a best-response strategy, under perfect Bayesian equilibria.
The following can be viewed as a generalization of [50] and [38] .
Theorem 2. In the finitely repeated game, under Assumptions 1 and 2, without any loss, player 1 only uses his type and π t (ω) = P σ (ω|z 2 [0,t−1] ) ∈ ∆(Ω) and t to generate a 1 t . That is, in any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium, any strategy of normal type player 1 can be replaced with a strategy which only depends on P σ (ω|z 2 [0,t−1] ) and t.
Proof ] ) as its sufficient statistic. Let us further note that:
The term P σ (a 1 t |ω, z 2 [0,t−1] ) is determined by the strategy of player 1 (this follows from Theorem 1), γ 1 t . As in [53] , this implies that the payoff at the last stage conditioned on z 2 [0,t−1] is given by
where, as earlier, we use the fact that z 2 t is conditionally independent of all the other variables at times s ≤ t given a 1 t . Let γ
t denote the strategy of player 1. The above state is then equivalent to, by the smoothing property of conditional expectation, the following:
The second line follows since once one picks the strategy γ is redundant given P σ (ω = ·|z 2 [0,t−1] ). Now, one can construct an equivalence class among the past z 2 [0,t−1] sequences which induce the same π t (·) = P σ (ω ∈ ·|z 2 [0,t−1] ), and can replace the strategy in this class with one, which induces a higher payoff among the finitely many elements in each class for the final time stage. An optimal output thus may be generated using π t and ω and t, by extending Witsenhausen's argument used earlier in the proof of Theorem 1 for the terminal time stage.
Since there are only finitely many past sequences and finitely many π t , this leads to a (Borel measurable) selection of ω for every π t , leading to a measurable strategy in π t , ω. Hence, the final stage payoff can be expressed as F t (π t ) for some F t , without any performance loss. The same argument applies for all time stages. To show this, we will apply induction as in [52] . At time t = T − 1, the sufficient statistic both for the immediate payoff, and the continuation payoff is P σ (ω|z 2 [0,t−1] ), and thus for the payoff impacting the time stage t = T , as a result of the optimality result for γ 1 T . To show that the separation result generalizes to all time stages, it suffices to prove that {(π t , γ 1 t )} has a controlled Markov chain form, if the players use the structure above. Now, for t ≥ 1, for all B ∈ B(∆(Ω)):
In the above derivation, we use the fact that the term P σ (a 1 t−1 |ω, z 2 [0,t−2] ) is uniquely identified by P σ (ω|z 2 [0,t−2] ) and γ 1 t−1 . We proceed with Theorem 3 which is an extension of Theorem 2 to the case of the infinitely repeated game. Theorem 3 will be the key result which gives us the controlled Markov chain construction.
Theorem 3. In the infinitely repeated game, under Assumptions 1 and 2, without any loss, player 1 only uses his type and P σ (ω|z 2 [0,t−1] ) and t to generate a 1 t and for the infinite horizon problem, the dependence on t is eliminated, leading to a stationary strategy which is optimal. There exists an optimal stationary solution so that
Proof of Theorem 3. First, going from a finite horizon to an infinite horizon follows from a change of order of limit and infimum as we discuss in the following. Observe that
On the other hand, due to the discounted nature of the problem, the right hand side can be studied through the dynamic programming (Bellman) iteration algorithms: The following dynamic program holds: Let π 2 t (w) = P σ (ω = w|z 2 [0,t−1] ).
where T is an operator defined by:
A value iteration sequence with V 1 0 = 0 and V t+1 = T (V n ) leads to a stationary solution. This is an infinite horizon discounted payoff optimal dynamic programming equation with finite action spaces (where the strategy is now the action γ 1 t ), and through a standard contraction argument [29] it can be shown that there is a stationary solution as t → ∞.
Thus, the sequence of maximizations sup γ 1 E[
Controlled Markov Chain Construction and Stationary Optimal Strategies
As a consequence of Theorem 3, under our setup, the set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria coincide with a properly defined set of Markov Perfect Equilibria since we can state the optimization problem as a controlled Markov chain as follows. We identify the state, action, transition kernels and the payoff functions:
• State: π t ∈ ∆(Ω), ω ∈ Ω; π t is often called the belief-state.
• Action: The action set is the set of all maps
We note here that, randomized strategies may also be considered by adding a randomization variable.
• Transition kernel: This is given by (3).
• Per-stage payoff: This is given by
where γ 2 t is a measurable function of the posterior P σ (a 1 t |z 2 [0,t] ). We note again that for a myopic player 2, a 2 ) is not unique, player 2 may also pick randomly an action a 2 according to some fixed probability measure with support contained in the set argmax a 2 ) . What we require is that Players 2 are myopic.
The Markov chain construction we obtained above leads to a dynamic programming problem which characterizes the equilibrium behavior of the strategic long-live player. We list this as a Corollary below. Corollary 1. In the infinitely repeated game, the behavior of the normal type long-lived player in any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium can be characterized by solving a dynamic programming problem.
Continuity of payoff values
We next obtain structural results regarding the continuity of the payoff values in the prior of player 2s, under further assumptions: Assumption 3. For every z and a, P (z 2 t = z|a 1 t = a) > 0.
Assumption 3 is a full support monitoring assumption, that is, any signal observed by the short lived player 2s happens with positive probability under every action of long-lived player 1.
We note that a strategy for player 2 which picks arg max a 1 P σ (a 1 t |z 2 [0,t] )u 2 (a 1 , a 2 ) in a measurable fashion is not continuous in the conditional probability κ(·) = P σ (a 1 t = ·|z 2 [0,t] ), since such a strategy quantizes the space of probability measures on A 1 . The set of κ for which this discontinuity holds is a subset of the set of probability measures B e = ∪ k,m∈A 2 B k,m , where for some pair k, m ∈ A 2 , the set B k,m is defined as
These are the sets of probability measures where player 2 is indifferent between two actions. However, even though the response of players 2 (that is, the strategy) is not continuous, the per-stage payoff function, G(π t , γ 1 ) may be continuous.
Remark 3. Two sufficient conditions for the continuity of G are as follows. (i) If the payoff functions for the players are identical or are aligned as in a potential game, using the fact that if f is a continuous function, for a compact U, the function min u∈U f (x, u) is continuous in x, continuity can be established; see e.g. the proof of Theorem 4 in [38] for a related discussion in the context of identical payoff functions. In our case, however, when the payoff functions for players 1 and 2 are not aligned, this is not guaranteed and counterexamples can be constructed, see [12] . (ii) Another sufficient condition for Assumption 4 to hold is that the probability measure P σ P σ (a 1 t = ·|z 2 [0,t] ) ∈ B e = 0 for all t values. In particular, if players 2 always have a unique best response so that the set of discontinuity is never visited (with probability 1), the assumption holds. Lemma 1. Under Assumption 3, the transition kernel is weakly continuous in the (belief ) state and action.
Proof of Lemma 1. From (3), we observe the following. Let f be a continuous function on ∆(Ω). Then f (π t+1 |π t , γ 1 t ) is continuous if
is continuous where π 2 t+1 = H(π t , z 2 t , γ 1 t ) defined by (3) with the variables
Now, for every fixed z 2 t , π 2 t+1 (ω) is continuous in π t for every ω, and hence H(π t , z 2 t , γ 1 t ) is continuous in total variation since pointwise convergence implies convergence in total variation. Furthermore, P σ (z 2 t |γ 1 t , π t ) is continuous in π t for a given γ 1 t ; thus, weak continuity follows.
The continuity of the kernel and the payoff function and the compactness of the action space leads to the following result. Proof of Theorem 4. Given Lemma 1 and Assumption 4, the proof follows from an inductive argument and the measurable selection hypothesis (see Theorem 3.3.5 in [29] ).
This result implies that, the equilibrium payoff obtained through dynamic programming is robust to small perturbations in the beliefs of player 2s. This implies that the following conjecture made by [13] is indeed true: There exists a particular equilibrium in the complete information game (the case when full mass is at the normal type) and a bound such that for any commitment type prior less than this bound, there exists an equilibrium of the incomplete information game where the long-lived player's payoff is arbitrarily close to her payoff from this particular equilibrium of the complete information game. 4 
Undiscounted Average Payoff Case and The Arbitrarily Patient Player 1
We next analyze the interesting setup where the strategic long-lived player wishes to maximize her undiscounted average payoffs. This analysis will then allow us to establish payoff bounds for the arbitrarily patient player 1 in the standard discounted average payoff case; such a technique does not seem to have been considered in the reputations literature before. In the undiscounted average payoff case, Player 1 wishes to maximize lim inf
in a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium. In any such equilibrium Players 2, as before -since they are myopic, just best rely to their updated beliefs. The issue with the undiscounted average payoff setup is that the structural coding/signaling results that one has for finite horizon or infinite horizon optimal control problems do not automatically generalize for the undiscounted average payoff case requiring more intricate arguments, see [38] . We will arrive at the desired conclusion using an indirect approach. Before we start our analysis, let us re-visit the discounted average payoff setup: Letπ be an invariant posterior. Equation (4) leads to the following fixed point equation:
Therefore,
and since the policy is asymptotically stationary, the optimal policy when π 0 = π has to be a Stackelberg solution for a Bayesian game with the posterior π; thus, an equilibrium policy has to be of stage-game Stackelberg type. Observe also that {π 2
} is a bounded martingale sequence for every i adapted to the information at player 2, and as a result as t → ∞, there existsπ such that π t →π almost surely.
Thus, every optimal strategy should be such that if player 2's belief has converged, then the equilibrium must be of Stackelberg type. Note also that, by the analysis in the previous section, player 2 behaves as if her strategy is optimal once his opinion is within a neighbourhood of the limit belief.
Once player 2s start best replying to the the limit belief, player 1's strategy locks in to be the Stackelberg action which is maximized according to the limit belief of player 2s.
We state the following identifiability assumption.
Assumption 5.
Uniformly over all stationary optimal (for some discount parameter) strategiesσ 1 ,σ 2 ,
A sufficient condition for Assumption 5 is the following.
Assumption 6. Let there be |Ω| − 1 commitment types and one normal type, who adopts a stationary strategy. For any initial prior, there exists a stopping time τ N such that for t ≥ τ N , player 2's belief on ω becomes so that his response does not change (that is, his best-response to his belief leads to a constant action). Furthermore, E[τ N ] < ∞, uniformly over any stationary strategy σ 1 .
A further sufficient explicit condition for Assumption 5 is the following one.
Theorem 5. Consider the matrix A whose rows consist of the vectors:
Proof of Theorem 5. Using [28] , we know that the conditional relative entropy
and Pinsker's inequality that convergence in total variation is implied by convergence in relative entropy; it follows that for every z ∈ Z 2
But,
Thus, all we need to ensure is that player 2's belief on P σ (a 1 t |h 2 t ) is sufficiently close to a terminal value. Suppose that the conditions of the theorem holds, but |P σ (a 1 t |h 2 t ) − P σ (a 1 t |h 2 t , ω)| > δ for some subsequence of time values. If the rank of A is |A 1 |, then, |P σ (a 1 t |h 2 t ) − P σ (a 1 t |h 2 t , ω)| > δ would imply that |P σ (z 2 t |h 2 t ) − P σ (z 2 t |h 2 t , ω)| > ǫ for some positive ǫ, which would be a contradiction (to see this, observe that the vector P σ (a 1 t |h 2 t ) − P σ (a 1 t |h 2 t , ω) cannot be orthogonal to each of the rows of A, due to the rank condition). In particular, (8) implies the convergence of P σ (a 1 t |h 2 t ) to a limit. Furthermore, Jensen's inequality implies that
and thus in finite expected time the deviation in the conditional probabilities will be less than a prescribed amount and Assumption 5 holds. We remark that the condition in Theorem 5 is identical to Assumption 2 in [13] . With this insight, note the following Abelian inequalities (see, e.g., Lemma 5.3.1 in [29] ): Let a n be a sequence of non-negative numbers and β ∈ (0, 1). Then,
Thus, for every strategy pair σ 1 , σ 2 , and ǫ > 0, there exists δ ǫ (depending possibly on the strategies) so that
Now, let σ 1 n , σ 2 n be a sequence of strategies which converge to the supremum for the average payoff. Letσ 1 n ,σ 2 n be one which comes within ǫ/2 of the supremum so that
Let now δ ǫ close to 1 be a discount factor whose optimal comes within ǫ/2 of the limit when δ = 1. For this parameter, underσ 1 n ,σ 2 n one obtains an upper bound on this payoff, which can be further upper bounded by optimizing over all possible strategies for this δ ǫ value. This leads to a stationary strategy. Thus,
where ǫ ′ is a consequence of the following analysis. Under any stationary optimal strategỹ σ 1 ,σ 2 for a discounted problem,
is uniformly bounded over all stationary policies under Assumption 5. Thus, one can select ǫ ′ and then ǫ arbitrarily small so that the result holds in the following fashion: First pick ǫ ′ > 0, find a corresponding δ ǫ ′ with the understanding that for all δ ǫ ∈ [δ ǫ ′ , 1), (10) holds. Now select δ ǫ ≥ δ ǫ ′ to satisfy the second inequality, such a δ ǫ is guaranteed to exist since there are infinitely many such δ values up to 1 that satisfies this inequality. Here the uniformity of the convergence in (11) over all stationary policies is crucial.
In the above analysis,σ 1 ,σ 2 are stationary and with this stationary strategy,
by the convergence of the expected empirical occupation measures, where ν * is the invariant probability measure which has full support on the Stackelberg strategies. This leads to the following result which say that the infimum over all strategies is equal to the infimum over strategies which satisfy the structure given in Theorem 3, let us call such strategies Π M :
Finally, we establish the following:
This follows from the fact that,
and that by the indentifiability condition through using the Stackelberg strategies optimal for π 0 = π * to an arbitrary π 0 , one obtains that
On the other hand, once a strategy is given in Π M , due to the identifiability assumption, any optimal strategy will need to be stage-game Stackelberg. These observations lead to the following: Corollary 2. In the undiscounted average payoff setup, under Assumption 5, an optimal strategy for the strategic Player 1 in the infinitely repeated game is stationary and is the stage-game Stackelberg strategy.
We now state an implication of Theorem 2, which is related to the findings of Fudenberg and Levine [24] and Corollary 1 of Gossner [28] . Proof of Theorem 6. By the Abelian theorem, for any δ, an upper bound is obtained by the corresponding average payoff problem. Since for every δ, an optimal policy is stationary, and under the stationary policy the average payoff converges to the one achieved by the case where the type of player 1 is correctly identified by player 2, the result follows from Theorem 2.
Theorem 6 provides an upper bound on the value of reputation for the strategic player 1 in the standard discounted average payoff setup. That is, in the standard discounted setting, arbitrarily patient strategic long-lived player 1 cannot do any better than his best Stackelberg payoff under reputational concerns as well. This upperbound coincides with the ones provided before by [24] and [28] .
A lower payoff bound on reputation through measure concentration
We recall here that Fudenberg and Levine [24] had, through a study of Bayesian updates, shown that player 2s can be surprised at most finitely many times when subjected to a sequence of actions by player 1 who plays according to a commitment type, in particular a state-wise Stackelberg type. Gossner [28] built on this and used information theoretic ideas to obtain a concise argument. Our analysis below makes the bounds sharper through a more refined analysis.
To obtain a lower bound, as in Fudenberg and Levine as well as Gossner, we let the strategic long-lived player 1 to pick a commitment typeω = m and mimick it forever to investigate the response of the short-live player 2s. Such a deviation is always possible for the normal type player 1. That is, the normal type of Player 1 is fixed to be a commitment type which has a positive prior and this type is a stage-game Stackelberg strategy.
Let |Ω| = n be the number of types. With m being the type mimicked by player 1, consider the following criterion.
for some f to be specified below, and for all k ∈ Ω. For some f (n), we will show that when (16) holds, the second player makes the decision as if he knew the type of player 1 is m.
This follows from the fact that
is continuous in P σ (ω|z 2 [0,t] ) and that P σ (ω|z 2 [0,t] ) concentrates around the true type under a mild informativeness condition on the observation variables.
Let
= max
when the mimicked commitment type is ω. Intuitively, this is the time when player 2 starts to behave as if the type of player 1 is m as far as his optimal strategies are concerned.
Lemma 2. Let ǫ > 0 be such that for all a 1 , x, y
Proof of Lemma 2.
be achieved by x * so that
for any x ′ . For this to hold it suffices that
and since < ∞ for all ω = k, ω = m and z 2 . Under Assumption 1, for all K ∈ N, P σ (τ ω N ≥ K) ≤ M ρ K for some ρ ∈ (0, 1) and M ∈ R. Proof of Theorem 7. (16) is equivalent to, by Baye's rule:
Note now that (16) implies that τ ω N ≤ t. Thus, we can now apply a measure concentration result through McDiarmid's inequality [44] to deduce that
. This implies, since log(n)/n → 0 and f (n) = n(1 − ǫ)/ǫ and by Lemma 2, that the probability of τ N ≥ t is upper bounded asymptotically by a geometric random variable. As a result, the stopping time is dominated by a geometric random variable. This implies that the discounted payoff can be lower bounded by the sum of two terms:
where r 1 S denotes the stage-game equilibrium payoff where player 2 knows that the type of player 1 is a commitment type.
To obtain a good lower bound, we take the maximum of the above over all commitment types. We now state this as a theorem. Theorem 8. A lower bound for the expected payoff of the strategic player 1 in any Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium is given by max ω∈Ω J(ω) where
Since such a deviation is available to the strategic (normal type) of player 1 in every equilibrium we know that this is a lower payoff bound for any perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Note also that this bound is obtained by player 1 mimicking a commitment type, i.e., a static strategy, unlike the previous discussion where we obtained optimal stationary (but not static in time) strategies.
The following now further quantifies a related finding by Fudenberg and Levine [24] . Our argument below is different in that we require an identifiability condition, whereas [24] only imposes that there exists some finite time after which players 2 respond assuming that the Stackelberg action is played by player 1. On the other hand, we provided above explicit bounds on the distribution of the (stopping) time after which this occurs.
Theorem 9. Suppose that there exists a commitment type which is the Stackelberg action with stage-game payoff C. If players 2 have positive prior measure on this type and if this type is identifiable, lim δ→1 J(ω) = C. That is, the strategic player 1 can guarantee herself a payoff close to her Stackelberg payoff when there is a slight probability that the long-lived player is a commitment type who always plays the Stackelberg action.
Proof of Theorem 9. Proof follows from Theorem 8 by taking the limit δ → 1. Since until time τ , we can bound the reward to player 1 by the worst possible value, and after τ the reward is the Stackelberg pay-off, we obtain
The limits lim δ→1 E[δ τ − 1] = 0 and lim δ→1 E[δ τ ] = 1 follow from the dominated convergence theorem and that τ is finite with probability 1.
Extensions
We now list several extensions of our results to more general information structures:
Simultaneous Move Stage Game
Our analysis so far focused on the case of a sequential move stage game whereas most of the reputations literature focuses on the case of a simultaneous move stage game. One way of generalizing our results to a case which is equivalent to a simultaneous stage game is as follows: Player 1 moves first, player 2 moves second without seeing any signal and the signals are drawn after Player2's action as follows: Player i's set of signals is a finite set Z i as before. When actions a = (a 1 , a 2 ) are chosen in the stage game by Player 1 and Player 2 respectively, a pair of signals z = (z 1 , z 2 ) ∈ Z := Z 1 × Z 2 is drawn according to the distribution q(.|a) ∈ ∆(Z). For α ∈ ∆(A 1 ) × ∆(A 2 ), let q(z|α) = E α q(z|a), and q 2 (.|α) denotes the marginal distribution of q(.|α) on Z 2 . Player 1 is informed of both components of z whereas Player 2 is only informed z 2 . 5 Under this setup one can generalize all of our results from above by assuming that the information at player 2 of time t is given by z 2 [0,t−1] instead of z 2 [0,t] . That is, Player 2 can only access the information from the previous period and hence her strategy is now given by: 6
The discussions from the previous subsection apply almost verbatim:
Theorem 10. In the finitely repeated game, under Assumption 1, without any loss, player 1 only uses his type and the information at player 2 at time t to generate a 1 t . In particular, under any fixed strategy for player 2, any strategy that player 1 adopts can be replaced with a strategy which only uses ω and {z 2 0 , z
Proof of Theorem 10. Proof follows from the same steps as that of Theorem 1. In particular, suppose that the fixed sequence of strategies {γ 2 t } is such that player 2 is not allowed to use z 2 t at time t. The proof applies identically. When we assume player 2s are Bayesian rational we get the following analog of Theorems 2 and 3 as follows:
Theorem 11. In the finitely and infinitely repeated game, under Assumptions 1 and 2, without any loss, player 1 only uses his type and P σ (ω|z 2 [0,t−1] ) and the time t to generate a 1 t . For the infinitely repeated game the time dependence can be eliminated leading to a stationary strategy which is optimal.
Proof of Theorem 11. The proof follows that of Theorem 3: (1) can be simplified as:
Player 2 at time 2 will use P σ (a 1 t |z 2 [0,t−1] ) as a sufficient statistic. The payoff at time
As in (2), the dependency on z 2 [0,t−1] is only through the selection on the strategy and the posterior on the type.
As earlier, we can construct an equivalence class among the past z 2 [0,t−1] sequences which induce the same π t (·) = P σ (ω ∈ ·|z 2 [0,t−1] ), and can replace the strategies in this class with one which induces a higher payoff among the finitely many elements in each class. An optimal strategy will then use ω and π t . This argument will apply to all time stages, once one observes that with the coding strategy stated, π t , γ 1 t forms a controlled Markov chain. This follows from the discussion earlier. 5 Even though the stage game is technically a sequential move game, it is strategically equivalent to a simultaneous move game. Therefore, this setup is identical to that of [24] and [28] . 6 Instead of σ This is a dynamic programming equation, and through a contraction argument, it can be shown that there is a stationary solution as t → ∞, which we state as a theorem.
Theorem 12.
There exists an optimal stationary solution so that a 1 t = γ 1 (ω, π t ) where π t (·) = P σ (ω ∈ ·|z 2 [0,t−1] ).
Players 2's actions affecting the nested information
Certain applications, such as online recommendation or review systems, can be modeled with a setup where future myopic players are affected not only by the information provided with the long-lived player but also by the actions of previous myopic players. In this case, we can replicate our previous results under the following assumption:
Assumption 7. P σ (z 2 t |a 1 s , a 2 s , s ≤ t) = P σ (z 2 t |a 1 t , a 2 t ).
Theorem 1 applies to this case with the proof being identical.
Theorem 13. In the finitely repeated game, under Assumptions 1 and 7, without any loss, player 1 only uses his type and the information of player 2 at time t to generate a 1 t . In particular, under any fixed sequence of strategies for myopic players (players 2), any strategy that player 1 adopts can be replaced with a strategy which only uses ω and {z 2 0 , z 2 1 , · · · , z 2 t−1 }.
Proof of Theorem 13. The proof follows as before with writing z 2 t = R(a 1 t , a 2 t , v t ). Theorem 3 also applies, provided that Assumption 2 holds, that is, players 2 are not strategic in the impact of their actions on future behaviour. Theorem 14. In the finitely and infinitely repeated games, under Assumptions 1, 2, and 7, without any loss, player 1 only uses his type and P σ (ω|z 2 [0,t−1] ) and the time information t to generate a 1 t . For the infinitely repeated game the time dependence can be eliminated leading to a stationary strategy which is optimal.
Proof of Theorem 14. The proof follows from the fact that with Assumption 7, the recursions satisfy P P σ (ω|z 
and thus the controlled Markov construction applies.
Finite memory vs. finite automata
Finally, we state the following remark regarding what happens when players 2 has finite memory:
Remark 4. (i) If there is a finite memory assumption in player 2, then the structural results in the paper does not apply in general, see Section II.C in [52] for a discussion on this setup in the context of zero-delay information theory.
(ii) On the other hand, if player 1 is restricted to have an automaton in the sense that, there exists a finite set M so that a 1 t = γ 1 t (m t , ω, z 2 t−1 ) and a 2 t = γ 2 t (z 2 [0,t−1] ) with m t ∈ M = ζ(m t−1 , z 2 t−1 ), a separation result can be obtained. Essentially, what is required is the establishment of a controlled Markov chain and this is possible in the automaton construction through the recursive update for m t .
Conclusion
In this paper, we approached the reputation problem in a control and information theoretic formulation where an informed long-lived player controls his/her reputation against uninformed short-lived players. In particular, given a strategic long-lived player who acts in a repeated game against a collection of short-lived (myopic) Bayesian players, we obtained an infinite horizon discounted payoff optimal strategy for the long-lived player through a control theoretic approach.
A dynamic programming formulation is obtained for the computation of optimal strategies for the long-lived player in a perfect Bayesian equilibrium: We also established the existence of the optimal stationary strategy and, under further assumptions, the continuity of the equilibrium payoffs.
The undiscounted average payoff problem and the arbitrarily patient long-lived player settings were also considered: We established the optimality of stationary strategies in the undiscounted average payoff setup, this helped us, by employing an Abelian Theorem, recover an upper payoff bound for the arbitrarily patient long-lived player in the discounted average payoff setup.
Furthermore, by using measure concentration techniques, we obtained a stronger lower payoff bound on the value of reputation. Not only our findings provide alternative interpretations of existing results, but also they provide generalizations regarding the structure of equilibrium strategies for finite-horizon, infinite-horizon and undiscounted settings, as well as continuity results in the prior probabilities, and improved upper and lower bounds on the value of reputations.
